Information Frictions and Employee Sorting between Start-ups.

Autor/inn/en	Bryan, Kevin A.; Hoffman, Mitchell; Sariri, Amir
Titel	Information Frictions and Employee Sorting between Start-ups. Gefälligkeitsübersetzung: Informationskonflikte und Mitarbeiterverteilung zwischen Start-ups.
Quelle	In: American economic journal. Applied economics, 18 (2026) 2, S. 369-406 PDF als Volltext Link als defekt meldenVerfügbarkeit
Sprache	englisch
Dokumenttyp	online; Zeitschriftenaufsatz
ISSN	1945-7790
DOI	10.1257/app.20240722
Schlagwörter	Wahrnehmung; Leistungsbeurteilung; Unternehmenserfolg; Unternehmensgründung; Arbeitsplatzwahl; Arbeitsuchender; Bewerbungsverhalten; Stellenangebot; Jobbörse; Wissenschaft; Auswirkung; Informationsangebot; Qualität; Hochschulabsolvent; Arbeitgeber; Experte; USA
Abstract	"Would workers apply to better firms if they were more informed about firm quality? Collaborating with 26 science-based start-ups, we create a custom job board and invite business school alumni to apply. The job board randomizes across applicants to show coarse expert ratings of all start-ups' science and/or business model quality. Making ratings visible strongly reallocates applications toward higher-rated firms. This reallocation holds, restricting to high-quality workers. Treatments operate in part by shifting worker beliefs about firms' right-tail outcomes. Despite these benefits, workers make posttreatment bets indicating highly overoptimistic beliefs about start-up success, suggesting a problem of broader informational deficits." The study refers to the period 2018-2022 (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku).
Erfasst von	Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung, Nürnberg
Update	2026/4