Is Teacher Effectiveness Fully Portable? Evidence from the Random Assignment of Transfer Incentives.

Autor/inn/en	Kraft, Matthew A.; Papay, John P.; James, Jessalynn K.; Monti-Nussbaum, Manuel
Institution	National Bureau of Economic Research
Titel	Is Teacher Effectiveness Fully Portable? Evidence from the Random Assignment of Transfer Incentives.
Quelle	Cambridge, Mass: National Bureau of Economic Research (2026) PDF als Volltext (1); PDF als Volltext (2) Link als defekt meldenVerfügbarkeit
Reihe	NBER working paper series. w34845
Beigaben	Illustrationen
Sprache	englisch
Dokumenttyp	online; Monografie; Graue Literatur
DOI	10.3386/w34845
Schlagwörter	Fertigkeit; Schule; Lehrer; Schätzung; Qualifikation; Arbeitspapier; Leistungsanreiz; USA
Abstract	We examine how performance changes when teachers transfer across very different school contexts. The Talent Transfer Initiative program created a rare natural experiment to study such transfers by randomly assigning low-achieving schools the ability to offer high-performing teachers at higher-achieving schools a $20,000 transfer stipend. Forecast tests show that these high-performing teachers' prior value added is only moderately predictive of their effectiveness in low-achieving schools. Using a difference-in-differences framework, we estimate that incentivized-transfer teachers' value added dropped by 0.12 student standard deviations. This decline appears to be driven by lower match quality, negative indirect school effects, and the loss of student-specific human capital.
Erfasst von	ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Kiel
Update	2026/3