The Pollution Game: A Classroom Game Demonstrating the Relative Effectiveness of Emissions Taxes and Tradable Permits

Autor/in	Corrigan, Jay R.
Titel	The Pollution Game: A Classroom Game Demonstrating the Relative Effectiveness of Emissions Taxes and Tradable Permits
Quelle	In: Journal of Economic Education, 42 (2011) 1, S.70-78 (9 Seiten)Infoseite zur Zeitschrift PDF als Volltext Verfügbarkeit
Sprache	englisch
Dokumenttyp	gedruckt; online; Zeitschriftenaufsatz
ISSN	0022-0485
Schlagwörter	Economics Education; Educational Games; Class Activities; Taxes; Pollution; Undergraduate Students + Suchen Sie Ihr Suchwort? Wirtschaftskunde; Educational game; Lernspiel; Abgabe; Schadstoffbelastung
Abstract	This classroom game illustrates the strengths and weaknesses of various regulatory frameworks aimed at internalizing negative externalities from pollution. Specifically, the game divides students into three groups--a government regulatory agency and two polluting firms--and allows them to work through a system of uniform command-and-control regulation, a tradable emissions permit framework, and an emissions tax. Students observe how flexible, market-oriented regulatory frameworks can outperform inflexible command-and-control. More important, given the ongoing debate about how best to regulate carbon dioxide emissions, students also can observe how the introduction of abatement-cost uncertainty can cause one market-oriented solution to outperform another. (Contains 4 tables and 5 notes.) (As Provided).
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Erfasst von	ERIC (Education Resources Information Center), Washington, DC
Update	2017/4/10