Does Ethical Theory Have a Place in Post-Kohlbergian Moral Psychology?

Autor/in	Maxwell, Bruce
Titel	Does Ethical Theory Have a Place in Post-Kohlbergian Moral Psychology?
Quelle	In: Educational Theory, 60 (2010) 2, S.167-188 (22 Seiten)Infoseite zur Zeitschrift PDF als Volltext Verfügbarkeit
Sprache	englisch
Dokumenttyp	gedruckt; online; Zeitschriftenaufsatz
ISSN	0013-2004
DOI	10.1111/j.1741-5446.2010.00352.x
Schlagwörter	Models; Psychology; Ethics; Moral Development; Cognitive Development; Criticism; Philosophy + Suchen Sie Ihr Suchwort? Analogiemodell; Psychologie; Ethik; Moralische Entwicklung; Kognitive Entwicklung; Kritik; Philosophie
Abstract	Philosophers tend to assume that theoretical frameworks in psychology suffer from conceptual confusion and that any influence that philosophy might have on psychology should be positive. Going against this grain, Dan Lapsley and Darcia Narvaez attribute the Kohlbergian paradigm's current state of marginalization within psychology to Lawrence Kohlberg's use of ethical theory in his model of cognitive moral development. Post-Kohlbergian conceptions of moral psychology, they advance, should be wary of theoretical constructs derived from folk morality, refuse philosophical starting points, and seek integration with literatures in psychology, not philosophy. In this essay, Bruce Maxwell considers and rejects Lapsley and Narvaez's diagnosis. The Kohlbergian paradigm's restricted conception of the moral domain is the result of a selective reading of one tendency in ethical theorizing (Kantianism). The idea that moral psychology may find shelter from normative criticism by avoiding ethics-derived models overlooks the deeper continuity between "ethical theory" and "psychological theory." The confusion and barrenness of psychology is not to be explained by calling it a "young science"; its state is not comparable with that of physics, for instance, in its beginnings. (Rather with that of certain branches of mathematics. Set theory.) For in psychology there are experimental methods and conceptual confusion. (As in the other case conceptual confusion and methods of proof.) The existence of the experimental method makes us think we have the means of solving the problems which trouble us; though problem and method pass one another by. (As Provided).
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Erfasst von	ERIC (Education Resources Information Center), Washington, DC
Update	2017/4/10