Self-Selection, Optimal Income Taxation, and Redistribution

Autor/in	Amegashie, J. Atsu
Titel	Self-Selection, Optimal Income Taxation, and Redistribution
Quelle	In: Journal of Economic Education, 40 (2009) 1, S.55-67 (13 Seiten)Infoseite zur Zeitschrift PDF als Volltext Verfügbarkeit
Sprache	englisch
Dokumenttyp	gedruckt; online; Zeitschriftenaufsatz
ISSN	0022-0485
Schlagwörter	Economics Education; Microeconomics; Taxes; Income; Selection; Tax Allocation; Models; Incentives; Access to Information; Undergraduate Study + Suchen Sie Ihr Suchwort? Wirtschaftskunde; Mikroökonomie; Abgabe; Einkommen; Auslese; Steuerentlastung; Analogiemodell; Anreiz; Grundstudium
Abstract	The author makes a pedagogical contribution to optimal income taxation. Using a very simple model adapted from George A. Akerlof (1978), he demonstrates a key result in the approach to public economics and welfare economics pioneered by Nobel laureate James Mirrlees. He shows how incomplete information, in addition to the need to preserve incentives, acts as a limit to a government's redistributive power. The model and technical analysis allow easy handling of three self-selection constraints in a manner that is accessible to students with knowledge of only intermediate microeconomics and elementary algebra. The diagrammatic exposition allows him to present interesting and insightful results. (Contains 3 figures and 11 notes.) (As Provided).
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Erfasst von	ERIC (Education Resources Information Center), Washington, DC
Update	2017/4/10