A Classroom Auction with Externalities: Applied to Mergers and Acquisitions

Autor/inn/en	Meister, J. Patrick; Anderson, Kyle J.
Titel	A Classroom Auction with Externalities: Applied to Mergers and Acquisitions
Quelle	In: Journal of Economic Education, 38 (2007) 3, S.297-307 (11 Seiten)Infoseite zur Zeitschrift PDF als Volltext Verfügbarkeit
Sprache	englisch
Dokumenttyp	gedruckt; online; Zeitschriftenaufsatz
ISSN	0022-0485
Schlagwörter	Economics Education; Simulation; Microeconomics; Class Activities; Game Theory; Air Transportation + Suchen Sie Ihr Suchwort? Wirtschaftskunde; Simulation program; Simulationsprogramm; Mikroökonomie; Spieltheorie
Abstract	The authors describe an in-class exercise in which students participate in an auction to buy US Airways. The exercise is based on events of late 1995, in which neither United nor American Airlines decided to bid for US Airways. Two teams of students participate in an English auction. Students learn that the equilibrium of the sequential game is that neither firm bid and, thereby, learn why US Airways did not sell at that time. In addition, two other teams participate in a sealed-bid auction, in which US Airways will sell in Nash equilibrium. Results typically have lined up with theoretical predictions. (Contains 1 figure and 3 notes.) (Author).
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Erfasst von	ERIC (Education Resources Information Center), Washington, DC
Update	2017/4/10