On-the-job training and rigidity of employment protection in the developing world. Evidence from differential enforcement.

Autor/inn/en	Almeida, Rita K.; Aterido, Reyes
Titel	On-the-job training and rigidity of employment protection in the developing world. Evidence from differential enforcement. Gefälligkeitsübersetzung: On-the-Job-Training und Starrheit des Kündigungsschutzes in der sich entwickelnden Welt.
Quelle	In: Labour economics, 18 (2011) Supplement 1, S. S71-S82 PDF als Volltext Link als defekt meldenVerfügbarkeit
Sprache	englisch
Dokumenttyp	online; gedruckt; Zeitschriftenaufsatz
ISSN	0927-5371
DOI	10.1016/j.labeco.2011.05.001
Schlagwörter	Bildung; Entwicklungsland; Investition; Kündigungsschutz; On-the-Job-Training; Betriebliche Weiterbildung; Internationaler Vergleich; Institution
Abstract	"This paper analyzes the causal effect between strict employment protection regulations and the firm incentive to invest in job training of their employees. We explore a large firm level data set across several developing countries and assume that the rigidity of labor regulations affects more the investment decision of firms that faces a rigid enforcement of labor regulations. Our findings show that differences across countries in the enforcement of more rigid employment protection regulation are associated with very small differences in the investment in job training across firms. This finding is robust across several specifications and samples." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku). Die Untersuchung enthält quantitative Daten. Forschungsmethode: empirisch-quantitativ; empirisch; Sekundäranalyse; Querschnitt. Die Untersuchung bezieht sich auf den Zeitraum 2002 bis 2005.
Erfasst von	Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung, Nürnberg
Update	2012/3