The True Self as Essentially Morally Good: An Obstacle to Virtue Development?

Autor/in	Stichter, Matt
Titel	The True Self as Essentially Morally Good: An Obstacle to Virtue Development?
Quelle	In: Journal of Moral Education, 51 (2022) 2, S.261-275 (15 Seiten)Infoseite zur Zeitschrift PDF als Volltext Verfügbarkeit
Zusatzinformation	ORCID (Stichter, Matt)
Sprache	englisch
Dokumenttyp	gedruckt; online; Zeitschriftenaufsatz
ISSN	0305-7240
DOI	10.1080/03057240.2021.1887830
Schlagwörter	Self Concept; Moral Values; Moral Development; Ethics; Behavior Patterns; Correlation; Prosocial Behavior; Individual Development; Failure + Suchen Sie Ihr Suchwort? Selbstkonzept; Moral value; Ethischer Wert; Moralische Entwicklung; Ethik; Korrelation; Individuelle Entwicklung
Abstract	Psychological research has revealed that there is a strong tendency for people to believe that they have a 'true self', and to believe that this true self is inherently morally good. This would seemingly be very good news for virtue theorists, since this may help to promote virtue development. While there are some obvious benefits to people having morality intrinsically tied to their sense of self, in this paper I want to suggest instead that there may also be some significant drawbacks, especially when it comes to motivating virtue development and moral improvement. In part this stems from people's belief in their own inherent moral goodness being merely assumed (as part of one's core identity), rather than earned (say through reliably good moral behavior). This disconnection between identity and behavior can result in attempts to reinforce one's identity as morally good, at the expense of virtuous behavior or self-improvement. (As Provided).
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Erfasst von	ERIC (Education Resources Information Center), Washington, DC
Update	2024/1/01