Incentives from Curriculum Tracking

Autor/in	Koerselman, Kristian
Titel	Incentives from Curriculum Tracking
Quelle	In: Economics of Education Review, 32 (2013), S.140-150 (11 Seiten)Infoseite zur Zeitschrift PDF als Volltext Verfügbarkeit
Sprache	englisch
Dokumenttyp	gedruckt; online; Zeitschriftenaufsatz
ISSN	0272-7757
DOI	10.1016/j.econedurev.2012.08.003
Schlagwörter	Foreign Countries; Educational Change; Inspection; Alignment (Education); Curriculum Design; Incentives; Achievement Gap; Scores; Educational Practices; Sweden; United Kingdom + Suchen Sie Ihr Suchwort? Ausland; Bildungsreform; Prüfverfahren; Lehrplangestaltung; Anreiz; Bildungspraxis; Schweden; Großbritannien
Abstract	Curriculum tracking creates incentives in the years before its start, and we should therefore expect test scores to be higher during those years. I find robust evidence for incentive effects of tracking in the UK based on the UK comprehensive school reform. Results from the Swedish comprehensive school reform are inconclusive. Internationally, I find a large and widening test score gap between early and late tracking countries. Incentive effects of tracking show how early age scores can be endogenous with respect to later-age policies, and add to a growing literature on incentives in education. (Contains 7 tables and 6 figures.) (As Provided).
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Erfasst von	ERIC (Education Resources Information Center), Washington, DC
Update	2017/4/10