A Low-Subsidy Problem in Public Higher Education

Autor/in	Fethke, Gary
Titel	A Low-Subsidy Problem in Public Higher Education
Quelle	In: Economics of Education Review, 30 (2011) 4, S.617-626 (10 Seiten)Infoseite zur Zeitschrift PDF als Volltext Verfügbarkeit
Sprache	englisch
Dokumenttyp	gedruckt; online; Zeitschriftenaufsatz
ISSN	0272-7757
DOI	10.1016/j.econedurev.2011.01.003
Schlagwörter	Income; Educational Finance; Tuition; Public Colleges; State Government; State Aid; Administrative Policy; Economic Factors; Educational Policy; Policy Analysis; Costs + Suchen Sie Ihr Suchwort? Einkommen; Bildungsfonds; Unterweisung; Unterricht; Bund-Länder-Beziehung; Ökonomischer Faktor; Politics of education; Bildungspolitik; Politikfeldanalyse; Cost; Kosten
Abstract	With an exogenous public subsidy and a break-even restriction on university net revenue, tuition discrimination supports a quasi-efficient departure from marginal-cost pricing. In contrast, when the legislature and university interact in their subsidy and tuition decisions, the public subsidy becomes endogenous. With an endogenous public subsidy, support by legislatures is affected by the same factors that influence tuition; this leads to a situation where higher tuition revenue is accompanied by a lower public subsidy. The welfare of students declines when this "low-subsidy" case develops. The university's ability to address this issue depends on its being able to commit to a tuition policy, and credible commitment appears consistent with existing institutional conditions. (As Provided).
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Erfasst von	ERIC (Education Resources Information Center), Washington, DC
Update	2017/4/10