Teacher Pension Incentives, Retirement Behavior, and Potential for Reform in Arkansas

Autor/inn/en	Costrell, Robert M.; McGee, Josh B.
Titel	Teacher Pension Incentives, Retirement Behavior, and Potential for Reform in Arkansas
Quelle	In: Education Finance and Policy, 5 (2010) 4, S.492-518 (27 Seiten)Infoseite zur Zeitschrift PDF als Volltext Verfügbarkeit
Sprache	englisch
Dokumenttyp	gedruckt; online; Zeitschriftenaufsatz
ISSN	1557-3060
DOI	10.1162/EDFP_a_00013
Schlagwörter	Retirement Benefits; Incentives; Decision Making; Teacher Motivation; Teacher Behavior; Simulation; Educational Finance; Financial Policy; Educational Policy; Policy Analysis; Longitudinal Studies; Finance Reform; Economic Change; Change Strategies; Teacher Retirement; Teacher Employment Benefits; Arkansas + Suchen Sie Ihr Suchwort? Retirement pay; Ruhegehalt; Anreiz; Decision-making; Entscheidungsfindung; Teacher behaviour; Lehrerverhalten; Simulation program; Simulationsprogramm; Bildungsfonds; Fiscal policy; Finanzpolitik; Politics of education; Bildungspolitik; Politikfeldanalyse; Longitudinal study; Longitudinal method; Longitudinal methods; Längsschnittuntersuchung; Financial reform; Finanzreform; Ökonomischer Wandel; Lösungsstrategie
Abstract	The authors analyze the Arkansas teacher pension plan and empirically gauge the behavioral response to incentives embedded in that plan and to possible reforms. The pattern of pension wealth accrual creates sharp incentives to work until eligible for early or normal retirement, often in one's early fifties, and to separate shortly thereafter. We estimate the effect of pension wealth accrual on teacher separation decisions using a new longitudinal data set of Arkansas teachers and find a significant impact. We then simulate the response to eliminating early retirement and raising the service requirement for normal retirement. We also simulate a shift to a constant accrual retirement plan. The response to both reforms is complex, as some would leave earlier and others stay longer. A constant accrual plan smoothes the pattern of retirement behavior as individuals tailor decisions to their own preferences instead of those built into the pension formula. (As Provided).
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Erfasst von	ERIC (Education Resources Information Center), Washington, DC
Update	2017/4/10