Faculty: Thy Administrator's Keeper? Some Evidence

Autor/in	Cunningham, Brendan M.
Titel	Faculty: Thy Administrator's Keeper? Some Evidence
Quelle	In: Economics of Education Review, 28 (2009) 4, S.444-453 (10 Seiten)Infoseite zur Zeitschrift PDF als Volltext Verfügbarkeit
Sprache	englisch
Dokumenttyp	gedruckt; online; Zeitschriftenaufsatz
ISSN	0272-7757
DOI	10.1016/j.econedurev.2008.07.005
Schlagwörter	College Faculty; Participation; Governance; Tenure; College Administration; Incentives; Teacher Administrator Relationship; Educational Finance + Suchen Sie Ihr Suchwort? Fakultät; Teilnahme; Education; Educational policy; Financing; Steuerung; Bildung; Erziehung; Bildungspolitik; Finanzierung; Amtszeit; Beschäftigungsdauer; College administrators; Hochschulverwaltung; Anreiz; Bildungsfonds
Abstract	Colleges and universities face a principal-agent problem. There are information asymmetries over the actions chosen by administrators. Because non-profit constraints limit the financial stake of trustees there may be insufficient monitoring of administrators and, consequentially, shirking. It is conceivable that faculty will serve as "delegated monitors" given the proper incentives. Faculty monitoring will most likely benefit a university when: (1) monitoring costs are low and (2) administrators cannot impose significant punishment costs on faculty. The practices of organized faculty participation in governance and tenure naturally achieve such ends. Empirical evidence from a sample of colleges and universities in the United States supports the hypothesis that features of a faculty's employment have significant effects on a university's financial performance. (Contains 3 tables.) (As Provided).
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Erfasst von	ERIC (Education Resources Information Center), Washington, DC
Update	2017/4/10