Why Do so Few Public School Districts Use Merit Pay?

Autor/inn/en	Goldhaber, Dan; DeArmond, Michael; Player, Daniel; Choi, Hyung-Jai
Titel	Why Do so Few Public School Districts Use Merit Pay?
Quelle	In: Journal of Education Finance, 33 (2008) 3, S.262-289 (28 Seiten)Infoseite zur Zeitschrift PDF als Volltext Verfügbarkeit
Sprache	englisch
Dokumenttyp	gedruckt; online; Zeitschriftenaufsatz
ISSN	0098-9495
Schlagwörter	Merit Pay; Academic Achievement; Teacher Salaries; School Districts; Public Schools; Models; Unions; Teaching Conditions; Recognition (Achievement); Principals; Incentives; Hypothesis Testing; Collective Bargaining; Accountability + Suchen Sie Ihr Suchwort? Leistungszulage; Schulleistung; Lehrerbesoldung; Lehrervergütung; School district; Schulbezirk; Public school; Öffentliche Schule; Analogiemodell; Lehrbedingungen; Unterrichtsbedingungen; Soziale Anerkennung; Principal; Schulleiter; Anreiz; Hypothesenprüfung; Hypothesentest; Tarifverhandlung; Verantwortung
Abstract	This article presents a principal-agent model in the context of public schools to help explain the use of merit pay for teachers. The model considers how both the nature of teaching and the political costs of union resistance affect school district merit pay decisions. Our results support the idea that merit pay is more likely in environments where there is more performance information and less likely where teachers are unionized. The negative effect from unions, however, appears stronger than the positive effect of performance information. We also find that teachers in merit pay districts earn more than their counterparts in non-merit pay districts. (Contains 5 tables and 25 footnotes.) (Author).
Anmerkungen	University of Illinois Press. 1325 South Oak Street, Champaign, IL 61820-6903. Tel: 217-244-0626; Fax: 217-244-8082; e-mail: journals@uillinois.edu; Web site: http://www.press.uillinois.edu/journals/main.html
Erfasst von	ERIC (Education Resources Information Center), Washington, DC
Update	2017/4/10