Literaturnachweis - Detailanzeige
| Autor/in | Levering, Bas |
|---|---|
| Titel | Epistemological Issues in Phenomenological Research: How Authoritative Are People's Accounts of Their Own Perceptions? |
| Quelle | In: Journal of Philosophy of Education, 40 (2006) 4, S.451-462 (12 Seiten)Infoseite zur Zeitschrift
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| Sprache | englisch |
| Dokumenttyp | gedruckt; online; Zeitschriftenaufsatz |
| ISSN | 0309-8249 |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1467-9752.2006.00531.x |
| Schlagwörter | Epistemology; Phenomenology; Research Methodology; Evaluation Research; Research Problems; Interrater Reliability; Validity; Data Interpretation; Value Judgment; Scientific Methodology |
| Abstract | Science tends to find a solution to the problem of the unreliability of human perception by understanding objectivity as the absence of subjectivity. However, from a phenomenological point of view, subjectivity is not so much a problem as an inevitable starting-point. That does not mean that the problem of the correctness of people's accounts of their own perceptions is no problem at all--in fact the problem is so great that the authority of a person's knowledge of his or her own mind can be doubted. The problem of subjectivity can only be solved when it is related to the problem of interpretation. Analyses of narratives are interpretations of interpretations. The phenomenologist must make sure that the data he or she analyses are lived interpretations and not interpretations of interpretations. (Author). |
| Anmerkungen | Blackwell Publishing. 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148. Tel: 800-835-6770; Tel: 781-388-8599; Fax: 781-388-8232; e-mail: customerservices@blackwellpublishing.com; Web site: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/jnl_default.asp |
| Erfasst von | ERIC (Education Resources Information Center), Washington, DC |
| Update | 2017/4/10 |
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