The Broad Applicability of Memory Bias and Its Coexistence with the Planning Fallacy: Reply to Griffin and Buehler (2005)

Autor/inn/en	Roy, Michael M.; Christenfeld, Nicholas J. S.; McKenzie, Craig R. M.
Titel	The Broad Applicability of Memory Bias and Its Coexistence with the Planning Fallacy: Reply to Griffin and Buehler (2005)
Quelle	In: Psychological Bulletin, 131 (2005), S.761-762 (2 Seiten) PDF als Volltext Verfügbarkeit
Sprache	englisch
Dokumenttyp	gedruckt; online; Zeitschriftenaufsatz
ISSN	0033-2909
Schlagwörter	Memory; Time Perspective; Time Management; Bias; Prediction + Suchen Sie Ihr Suchwort? Gedächtnis; Zeitbezug; Zeitmanagement; Vorhersage
Abstract	People chronically underestimate how long tasks will take. In their original article, the present authors (M. M. Roy, N. J. S. Christenfeld, & C. R. M. McKenzie) suggested a simple, broadly applicable explanation: Biased predictions result from biased memories. In their comment article, D. Griffin and R. Buehler suggested that in many domains in which this memory-bias account appears to outpredict their own account, theirs actually makes no prediction at all. However, the present authors did not suggest that only 1 theory is right but that theirs is consistent with data that prior theories, including their own, cannot explain. Ignoring memories of past tasks is not a complete explanation for the phenomenon if the memories people could consult are themselves biased. Nonetheless, underestimating future task duration is almost certainly multiply determined, and thus our account and theirs can coexist. (Author).
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Erfasst von	ERIC (Education Resources Information Center), Washington, DC
Update	2017/4/10