Grade Dropping, Strategic Behavior, and Student "Satisficing"

Autor/inn/en	Hadsell, Lester; MacDermott, Raymond
Titel	Grade Dropping, Strategic Behavior, and Student "Satisficing"
Quelle	In: American Journal of Business Education, 3 (2010) 7, S.57-72 (16 Seiten) PDF als Volltext kostenfreie Datei Verfügbarkeit
Sprache	englisch
Dokumenttyp	gedruckt; online; Zeitschriftenaufsatz
ISSN	1942-2504
Schlagwörter	Student Behavior; Tests; Scores; Grades (Scholastic); Probability; Student Attitudes; Achievement Gains; Grading; Educational Policy; Introductory Courses; Finance Occupations; Business Administration Education; Test Preparation; Decision Making; Statistical Analysis; Undergraduate Students; Comparative Analysis; Student Motivation + Suchen Sie Ihr Suchwort? Student behaviour; Schülerverhalten; Examination; Prüfung; Examen; Notenspiegel; Wahrscheinlichkeitsrechnung; Wahrscheinlichkeitstheorie; Achievement gain; Leistungssteigerung; Notengebung; Schulnote; Politics of education; Bildungspolitik; Einführungskurs; Finanzbuchhalter; Decision-making; Entscheidungsfindung; Statistische Analyse; Schulische Motivation
Abstract	An extensive database of exam scores is studied to determine the effects of a grading policy that drops the lowest exam score. We find evidence that some students engage in strategic behavior, either by understudying for one of the exams or missing one altogether, but the vast majority of students show no evidence of strategic behavior. We also find evidence that many students "satisfice", showing how a large percentage of students passed up an expected improvement in their course grade. We find that the probability a student will choose to complete an optional final exam is inversely related to their grade going into the final. Further, the likelihood of a student completing the final exam rises with the spread between prior exam scores and falls with the points needed to raise their course grade. (As Provided).
Anmerkungen	Clute Institute. 6901 South Pierce Street Suite 239, Littleton, CO 80128. Tel: 303-904-4750; Fax: 303-978-0413; e-mail: Staff@CluteInstitute.com; Web site: http://www.cluteinstitute.com
Erfasst von	ERIC (Education Resources Information Center), Washington, DC
Update	2020/1/01