Differences in the Weighting and Choice of Evidence for Plausible versus Implausible Causes

Autor/inn/en	Goedert, Kelly M.; Ellefson, Michelle R.; Rehder, Bob
Titel	Differences in the Weighting and Choice of Evidence for Plausible versus Implausible Causes
Quelle	In: Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 40 (2014) 3, S.683-702 (20 Seiten) PDF als Volltext Verfügbarkeit
Sprache	englisch
Dokumenttyp	gedruckt; online; Zeitschriftenaufsatz
ISSN	0278-7393
DOI	10.1037/a0035547
Schlagwörter	Causal Models; Inferences; Beliefs; Attitude Change; Difficulty Level; Change Strategies; Evidence; Thinking Skills; Critical Thinking; Cognitive Processes; Experiments; Hypothesis Testing; Statistical Analysis; Correlation; Undergraduate Students; Information Utilization; Data Interpretation; Foreign Countries; New Jersey; United Kingdom (Cambridge) + Suchen Sie Ihr Suchwort? Kausalanalyse; Inference; Inferenz; Belief; Glaube; Attitudinal change; Einstellungsänderung; Schwierigkeitsgrad; Lösungsstrategie; Evidenz; Denkfähigkeit; Kritisches Denken; Cognitive process; Kognitiver Prozess; Erprobung; Hypothesenprüfung; Hypothesentest; Statistische Analyse; Korrelation; Informationsnutzung; Data evaluation; Datenauswertung; Ausland
Abstract	Individuals have difficulty changing their causal beliefs in light of contradictory evidence. We hypothesized that this difficulty arises because people facing implausible causes give greater consideration to causal alternatives, which, because of their use of a positive test strategy, leads to differential weighting of contingency evidence. Across 4 experiments, participants learned about plausible or implausible causes of outcomes. Additionally, we assessed the effects of participants' ability to think of alternative causes of the outcomes. Participants either saw complete frequency information (Experiments 1 and 2) or chose what information to see (Experiments 3 and 4). Consistent with the positive test account, participants given implausible causes were more likely to inquire about the occurrence of the outcome in the absence of the cause (Experiments 3 and 4) than those given plausible causes. Furthermore, they gave less weight to Cells A and B in a 2 × 2 contingency table and gave either equal or less weight to Cells C and D (Experiments 1 and 2). These effects were inconsistently modified by participants' ability to consider alternative causes of the outcome. The total of the observed effects are not predicted by either dominant models of normative causal inference or by the particular positive test account proposed here, but they may be commensurate with a more broadly construed positive test account. (As Provided).
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Update	2020/1/01