Price Collusion or Competition in US Higher Education

Autor/in	Gu, Jiafeng
Titel	Price Collusion or Competition in US Higher Education
Quelle	In: Studies in Higher Education, 40 (2015) 2, S.253-277 (25 Seiten)Infoseite zur Zeitschrift PDF als Volltext Verfügbarkeit
Sprache	englisch
Dokumenttyp	gedruckt; online; Zeitschriftenaufsatz
ISSN	0307-5079
DOI	10.1080/03075079.2013.823929
Schlagwörter	Higher Education; Competition; School Location; Educational Finance; Student Costs; Correlation; Proximity; Game Theory; Universities; Least Squares Statistics; Cooperation + Suchen Sie Ihr Suchwort? Hochschulbildung; Hochschulsystem; Hochschulwesen; Wettkampf; Schulgelände; Bildungsfonds; Studienkosten; Korrelation; Lebensnähe; Spieltheorie; University; Universität; Co-operation; Kooperation
Abstract	How geographical neighboring competitors influence the strategic price behaviors of universities is still unclear because previous studies assume spatial independence between universities. Using data from the National Center for Education Statistics college navigator dataset, this study shows that the price of one university is spatially autocorrelated to its neighboring competitors and such neighborhood structure induces cooperation Nash equilibrium in a spatial price game. In the spatial price game of universities the possibility of the cooperation solution is about 76%, while that of the defeat solution is about 24%. This study demonstrates that the relation between price difference and geographical distance of universities is an inverse U-shaped curve rather than a line. (As Provided).
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Erfasst von	ERIC (Education Resources Information Center), Washington, DC
Update	2020/1/01