Self-Interest in Public Service: Evidence from School Board Elections. Working Paper 29791

Autor/inn/en	Billings, Stephen B.; Macartney, Hugh; Park, Geunyong; Singleton, John D.
Institution	National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
Titel	Self-Interest in Public Service: Evidence from School Board Elections. Working Paper 29791
Quelle	(2022) PDF als Volltext Verfügbarkeit
Sprache	englisch
Dokumenttyp	gedruckt; online; Monographie
Schlagwörter	Boards of Education; Achievement Tests; Scores; Elections; Public Service; Housing; Costs; Neighborhoods; Political Candidates; Public Schools; Political Attitudes; Outcomes of Education; Elementary Secondary Education; Correlation; Comparative Analysis; School Effectiveness; Attendance + Suchen Sie Ihr Suchwort? Ausschuss; Achievement test; Achievement; Testing; Test; Tests; Leistungsbeurteilung; Leistungsüberprüfung; Leistung; Testdurchführung; Testen; Election; Wahl; Public services; Öffentlicher Sozialdienst; Unterkunft; Cost; Kosten; Neighbourhoods; Nachbarschaft; Public school; Öffentliche Schule; Political attitude; Politische Einstellung; Lernleistung; Schulerfolg; Korrelation; Schuleffizienz; Anwesenheit
Abstract	In this paper, we show that the election of a new school board member causes home values in their neighborhood to rise. This increase is identified using narrowly-decided contests and is driven by non-Democratic members, whose neighborhoods appreciate about 4% on average relative to those of losing candidates. We find that student test scores in the neighborhood public schools of non-Democratic winners also relatively increase, but this effect is driven by changing student composition, including via the manipulation of attendance zones, rather than improvements in school quality (as measured by test score value-added). Notably, we detect no differential changes when comparing neighborhood or scholastic outcomes between winning and losing Democratic school board candidates. These results suggest that partisan affiliation is correlated with private motivations for seeking public office. (As Provided).
Anmerkungen	National Bureau of Economic Research. 1050 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge, MA 02138-5398. Tel: 617-588-0343; Web site: http://www.nber.org
Erfasst von	ERIC (Education Resources Information Center), Washington, DC
Update	2024/1/01