Literaturnachweis - Detailanzeige
| Autor/inn/en | Terrier, Camille; Pathak, Parag A.; Ren, Kevin |
|---|---|
| Institution | London School of Economics and Political Science (United Kingdom), Centre for Economic Performance (CEP) |
| Titel | From Immediate Acceptance to Deferred Acceptance: Effects on School Admissions and Achievement in England. Discussion Paper No. 1815 |
| Quelle | (2021), (61 Seiten)
PDF als Volltext kostenfreie Datei |
| Sprache | englisch |
| Dokumenttyp | gedruckt; online; Monographie |
| ISSN | 2042-2695 |
| Schlagwörter | Admission (School); Socioeconomic Status; Low Income Students; Social Differences; Foreign Countries; Disadvantaged; Admission Criteria; School Districts; Educational Quality; Institutional Characteristics; Academic Achievement; Student Characteristics; Comparative Analysis; Parent Attitudes; Preferences; Competition; Elementary Secondary Education; United Kingdom (England) |
| Abstract | Countries and cities around the world increasingly rely on centralized systems to assign students to schools. Two algorithms, deferred acceptance (DA) and immediate acceptance (IA), are widespread. The latter is often criticized for harming disadvantaged families who fail to get access to popular schools. This paper investigates the effect of the national ban of the IA mechanism in England in 2008. Before the ban, 49 English local authorities used DA and 16 used IA. All IA local authorities switched to DA afterwards, giving rise to a cross-market difference-in-differences research design. Our results show that the elimination of IA reduces measures of school quality for low-SES students more than high-SES students. After the ban, low-SES students attend schools with lower value-added and more disadvantaged and low-achieving peers. This effect is primarily driven by a decrease in low-SES admissions at selective schools. Our findings point to an unintended consequence of the IA to DA transition: by encouraging high-SES parents to report their preferences truthfully, DA increases competition for top schools, which crowds out low-SES students. (As Provided). |
| Anmerkungen | Centre for Economic Performance. London School of Economics and Political Science, Houghton Street, London, WC2A 2AE, UK. Tel: +44-20-7955-7673; Fax: +44-20-7404-0612; e-mail: cep.info@lse.ac.uk; Web site: http://cep.lse.ac.uk |
| Erfasst von | ERIC (Education Resources Information Center), Washington, DC |
| Update | 2024/1/01 |
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