When Information Is Not Enough: Evidence from a Centralized School Choice System. Working Paper 27887

Autor/inn/en	Ajayi, Kehinde F.; Friedman, Willa H.; Lucas, Adrienne M.
Institution	National Bureau of Economic Research
Titel	When Information Is Not Enough: Evidence from a Centralized School Choice System. Working Paper 27887
Quelle	(2020) PDF als Volltext Verfügbarkeit
Sprache	englisch
Dokumenttyp	gedruckt; online; Monographie
Schlagwörter	School Choice; Centralization; Access to Information; Junior High School Students; Parents; Foreign Countries; Admission (School); Institutional Characteristics; Secondary Schools; Ghana + Suchen Sie Ihr Suchwort? Choice of school; Schulwahl; Centralisation; Zentralisierung; Junior High Schools; Student; Students; Sekundarstufe I; Schüler; Schülerin; Eltern; Ausland; Sekundarschule
Abstract	Students often make school choice decisions with inadequate information. We present results from delivering information to randomly selected students (and some randomly selected parents) across 900 junior high schools in Ghana, a country with universal secondary school choice. We provided guidance on application strategies and reported the selectivity and exit exam performance of secondary schools, information students and parents prioritized. We find that despite information changing the characteristics of schools to which students applied and students gaining admission to higher value-added schools, they were not more likely to matriculate on time or at all. Information was not the only constraint. [Funding is provided by the Post-Primary Education Initiative of the Jameel Poverty Action Lab (J-PAL), the Weiss Family Program Fund, and University of Delaware Institute for Global Studies' Global Exchange Program.] (As Provided).
Anmerkungen	National Bureau of Economic Research. 1050 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge, MA 02138-5398. Tel: 617-588-0343; Web site: http://www.nber.org
Erfasst von	ERIC (Education Resources Information Center), Washington, DC
Update	2024/1/01