Literaturnachweis - Detailanzeige
Autor/inn/en | Abdulkadiroglu, Atila; Pathak, Parag A.; Roth, Alvin E. |
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Institution | National Bureau of Economic Research |
Titel | Strategy-proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the New York City High School Match. NBER Working Paper No. 14864 |
Quelle | (2009)
PDF als Volltext |
Sprache | englisch |
Dokumenttyp | gedruckt; online; Monographie |
Schlagwörter | High Schools; Urban Schools; Efficiency; Student Placement; Admission (School); Public Schools; School Choice; Simulation; New York |
Abstract | The design of the New York City (NYC) High School match involved tradeoffs among efficiency, stability and strategy-proofness that raise new theoretical questions. We analyze a model with indifferences--ties--in school preferences. Simulations with field data and the theory favor breaking indifferences the same way at every school--single tie breaking--in a student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism. Any inefficiency associated with a realized tie breaking cannot be removed without harming student incentives. Finally, we empirically document the extent of potential efficiency loss associated with strategy-proofness and stability, and direct attention to some open questions. (As Provided). |
Anmerkungen | National Bureau of Economic Research. 1050 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge, MA 02138-5398. Tel: 617-588-0343; Web site: http://www.nber.org/cgi-bin/get_bars.pl?bar=pub |
Erfasst von | ERIC (Education Resources Information Center), Washington, DC |
Update | 2017/4/10 |