Speeding, Tax Fraud, and Teaching to the Test. CSE Report 659

Autor/in	Lazear, Edward P.
Institution	California Univ., Los Angeles. Center for the Study of Evaluation.
Titel	Speeding, Tax Fraud, and Teaching to the Test. CSE Report 659
Quelle	(2005), (48 Seiten) PDF als Volltext kostenfreie Datei Verfügbarkeit
Sprache	englisch
Dokumenttyp	gedruckt; online; Monographie
Schlagwörter	Figurative Language; Testing; High Stakes Tests; Student Evaluation; Evaluation Methods; Standardized Tests + Suchen Sie Ihr Suchwort? Testdurchführung; Testen; Schulnote; Studentische Bewertung; Standadised tests; Standardisierter Test
Abstract	Educators worry that high-stakes testing will induce teachers and their students to focus only on the test and ignore other, untested aspects of knowledge. Some counter that although this may be true, knowing something is better than knowing nothing and many students would benefit even by learning the material that is to be tested. Using the metaphor of deterring drivers from speeding, it is shown that the optimal rules for high-stakes testing depend on the costs of learning and of monitoring. For high cost learners, and when monitoring technology is inefficient, it is better to announce what will be tested. For efficient learners, de-emphasizing the test itself is the right strategy. This is analogous to telling drivers where the police are posted when police are few. At least there will be no speeding on those roads. When police are abundant or when the fine is high relative to the benefit from speeding, it is better to keep police locations secret, which results in obeying the law everywhere. Children who are high cost learners are less likely to learn all the material and therefore learn more when they are told what is on the exam. The same logic also implies that tests should be clearly defined for younger children, but more amorphous for more advanced students. (Author).
Anmerkungen	National Center for Research on Evaluation, Standards, and Student Testing (CRESST), Graduate School of Education & Information Studies, University of California, Los Angeles, Los Angeles, CA 90095-1522. Tel: 310-206-1532.
Erfasst von	ERIC (Education Resources Information Center), Washington, DC
Update	2017/4/10