An Incentives Approach to Improving the Unemployment Compensation System.

Autor/inn/en	Burgess, Paul L.; Kingston, Jerry L.
Institution	Upjohn (W.E.) Inst. for Employment Research, Kalamazoo, MI.
Titel	An Incentives Approach to Improving the Unemployment Compensation System.
Quelle	(1987), (285 Seiten) PDF als Volltext kostenfreie Datei Verfügbarkeit
Beigaben	Tabellen
Sprache	englisch
Dokumenttyp	gedruckt; online; Monographie
ISBN	0-88099-048-1
Schlagwörter	Adults; Eligibility; Employer Employee Relationship; Incentives; Program Administration; Program Evaluation; Program Implementation; Quality Control; Taxes; Unemployment; Unemployment Insurance + Suchen Sie Ihr Suchwort? Eignung; Anreiz; Programme evaluation; Programmevaluation; Qualitätskontrolle; Abgabe; Arbeitslosigkeit; Unemployment benefit; Arbeitslosenversicherung
Abstract	A study addressed the issue of overpayments and other quality problems in the unemployment compensation (UC) program and was current as of June 1987. Principal findings are as follows: (1) overpayments constituted a major problem for the UC system as a whole; (2) high overpayment rates were symptomatic of fundamental problems including difficulties posed by system complexity, adverse incentives for system participants, and the difficulties state agencies have in monitoring claimant compliance with weekly eligibility criteria; (3) the UC system appeared to be excessively complex; (4) federal performance criteria neglected many important aspects of state UC program quality and tended to create adverse incentives by overemphasizing the speed versus the quality of claim processing and payments; (5) adverse incentives within state UC systems typically did not discourage and may even have encouraged ineligible claimants to file for benefits; (6) tax incentives for individual employers to engage in monitoring of individual claimant compliance with eligibility criteria were quite weak; (7) state agency personnel typically had very limited incentives to prevent either underpayments or overpayments or to detect or recover overpayments; and (8) the interaction of excessive program complexity, limited administrative funding, and adverse incentives made it extremely difficult for state agencies to monitor effectively claimant compliance with many UC program requirements, especially those that were to be met on a weekly basis. (A 13-page bibliography is included.) (CML)
Anmerkungen	W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, 300 South Westnedge Avenue, Kalamazoo, MI 49007 ($13.95 paperback, ISBN 0-88099-048-1; $22.95 clothbound, ISBN 0-88099-049-X).
Erfasst von	ERIC (Education Resources Information Center), Washington, DC
Update	2004/1/01