Literaturnachweis - Detailanzeige
Autor/in | Cigno, Alessandro |
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Titel | How to deal with covert child labour, and give children an effective education, in a poor developing country. An optimal taxation problem with moral hazard. |
Quelle | München: CESifo (2010), 14 S.
PDF als Volltext |
Reihe | CESifo working paper. 3077. Economics of Education |
Sprache | englisch |
Dokumenttyp | online; Monographie; Graue Literatur |
Schlagwörter | Bildungsverhalten; Finanzierung; Schule; Steuer; Theorie; Kinderarbeit; Bildungsverhalten; Schule; Finanzierung; Kinderarbeit; Steuer; Subventionierung; Arbeitspapier; Theorie |
Abstract | Given that credit and insurance markets are imperfect, and given also that intra-household transfers, and much of the work a child does, are private information, the second-best policy uses a combination of need and merit based education awards, together with a mix of taxes on parental income, and on the return to educational investment. It also makes school enrollment compulsory and, if the child wage rate is sufficiently high, sets a ceiling, decreasing in parental income, on overt child labour. |
Erfasst von | ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Kiel |
Update | 2010/4 |