How to deal with covert child labour, and give children an effective education, in a poor developing country. An optimal taxation problem with moral hazard.

Autor/in	Cigno, Alessandro
Titel	How to deal with covert child labour, and give children an effective education, in a poor developing country. An optimal taxation problem with moral hazard.
Quelle	Tokyo: Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University (2010), 16 S., 140 KB PDF als Volltext kostenfreie Datei (1); PDF als Volltext kostenfreie Datei (2); PDF als Volltext kostenfreie Datei (3) Link als defekt meldenVerfügbarkeit
Reihe	PIE - CIS discussion paper. 474
Sprache	englisch
Dokumenttyp	online; Monographie; Graue Literatur
Schlagwörter	Bildungsverhalten; Finanzierung; Moral; Risiko; Schule; Steuer; Theorie; Kinderarbeit; Bildungsverhalten; Schule; Moral; Finanzierung; Kinderarbeit; Steuer; Subventionierung; Arbeitspapier; Risiko; Theorie
Abstract	As the return to education (and possibly also parental income) is uncertain, and given that the work a child does covertly for his own parents, and transfers between parents and children, are private information, the government should make school enrollment compulsory, set a legal limit (decreasing in parental income) on overt child labour, and redistribute across families using a flat-rate education grant, and a tax on parental income. That done, it should use a scholarship increasing in school results, and a tax on the skill premium, to raise the expected return to educational investment, and make it less uncertain.
Erfasst von	ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Kiel
Update	2011/2