Opposite effects of competition and rents on collective bargaining. Evidence from Germany.

Autor/in	Martensen, Finn
Institution	Universität Konstanz / Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften
Titel	Opposite effects of competition and rents on collective bargaining. Evidence from Germany.
Quelle	Konstanz (2014), 36 S. PDF als Volltext kostenfreie Datei Link als defekt meldenVerfügbarkeit
Reihe	University of Konstanz, Department of Economics. Working paper. 2014-15
Sprache	englisch
Dokumenttyp	online; gedruckt; Monographie
Schlagwörter	Panel; Determinante; Export; Flächentarifvertrag; Gewinn; Gütermarkt; Tarifverhandlung; Tarifvertrag; Wettbewerb; Arbeitsproduktivität; Beschäftigungsstruktur; Lohnfindung; Qualifikationsstruktur; IAB-Betriebspanel; Quote; Betrieb; Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung
Abstract	Why do firms and workers bargain individually or collectively? I test the effect of product market competition and rents with German establishment data. Against intuition, competition and rents have opposite effects. Competition has a u-shaped effect on the probability of collective bargaining. This contradicts the existing theory (Ebell and Haefke 2006; Boeri and Burda 2009). By contrast, firms with higher rents are more prone to collective bargaining. For both competition and rents, the effect is stronger for sector-level than for firm-level collective bargaining. Indicators of higher productivity also matter: A higher export share drives firms into individual wage bargaining, while a higher share of workers with higher education drives firms into firm-level bargaining. Thus, the interplay between productivity, competition, and the wage setting regime is much more subtle than suggested by the existing theory. (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku).
Erfasst von	Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung, Nürnberg
Update	2015/1