Loose knots. Strong versus weak commitments to save for education in Uganda.

Autor/inn/en	Karlan, Dean S.; Linden, Leigh L.
Titel	Loose knots. Strong versus weak commitments to save for education in Uganda.
Quelle	Bonn: IZA (2014), 33 S. PDF als Volltext kostenfreie Datei (1); PDF als Volltext kostenfreie Datei (2) Link als defekt meldenVerfügbarkeit
Reihe	Discussion paper series / Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit. 7901
Beigaben	grafische Darstellungen
Sprache	englisch
Dokumenttyp	online; gedruckt; Monographie; Graue Literatur
Schlagwörter	Bildung; Bildungsverhalten; Bildungsniveau; Bildungsmittel; Bildung; Finanzierung; Schulbesuch; Sparen; Uganda; Versicherung; Pflicht; Bildungsniveau; Bildungsverhalten; Wirkungsanalyse; Bildungskosten; Schulbesuch; Pflicht; Finanzierung; Sparen; Versicherung; Arbeitspapier; Wirkungsanalyse; Uganda
Abstract	Commitment devices offer an opportunity to restrict future choices. However, if severe restrictions deter participation, weaker restrictions may be a more effective means of changing behavior. We test this using a school-based commitment savings device for educational expenses in Uganda. We compare an account fully-committed to educational expenses to an account in which savings are available for cash withdrawal but intended for educational expenses. The weaker commitment generates increased savings in the program accounts and when combined with a parent outreach program, higher expenditures on educational supplies. It also increases scores on an exam covering language and math skills by 0.14 standard deviations. We find no effect for the fully-committed account, and we find no effect for either account on attendance, enrollment, or non-cognitive skills.
Erfasst von	ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Kiel
Update	2014/3