Rebate contracts and consumer tariff choice. Three essays on industrial organization theory.

Autor/in	Graf, Julia
Titel	Rebate contracts and consumer tariff choice. Three essays on industrial organization theory.
Quelle	Düsseldorf: Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek der Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf (2013), VI, 103 S. PDF als Volltext kostenfreie Datei (1); PDF als Volltext kostenfreie Datei (2); PDF als Volltext kostenfreie Datei (3) Link als defekt meldenVerfügbarkeit Düsseldorf, Univ., Diss., 2013.
Sprache	englisch
Dokumenttyp	online; Monographie; Graue Literatur
URN	urn:nbn:de:hbz:061-20140213-111743-7
Schlagwörter	Verhalten; Test; Deutschland; Dissertation; Gesundheit; Kosten; Rationalität; Student; Telekommunikation; Test; Verhalten; Vertrag; Vertragsrecht; Wirtschaftssektor; Gesundheit; Telekommunikation; Rationalität; Konsument; Konsumverhalten; Kosten; Vertrag; Vertragsrecht; Wirtschaftssektor; Dissertation; Student; Deutschland
Abstract	This thesis focuses on two distinct fields: the health care and the telecommunications sector. One the one hand, it deals with rebate contracts in the health care sector. The aim of this thesis is to analyze different forms and aspects of rebate contracts. We answer the question, are rebate contracts in general appropriate methods to decrease total expenditures, both in a static and a dynamic analysis. Additionally, we present the effects of different rebate contract forms on firms profits, consumer surplus and total welfare. By that, we show that there exists no superior rebate contract form. On the other hand, the thesis deals with irrational consumer choices in the context of cell phone tariff choices. To find out why consumers choose calling plans that are not cost-minimizing, we run an experiment with students and staff of the Heinrich-Heine-University of Düsseldorf. We find that participants are often not aware of their actual consumption and hold preferences for certain tariff forms.
Erfasst von	ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Kiel
Update	2014/3