Nash bargaining and the wage consequences of educational mismatches.

Autor/inn/en	Hartog, Joop; Sattinger, Michael
Titel	Nash bargaining and the wage consequences of educational mismatches. Gefälligkeitsübersetzung: Nash-Verhandlungen und die Lohnkonsequenzen des Bildungsmismatches.
Quelle	Bonn: IZA (2012), 10 S., 139,93 KB PDF als Volltext kostenfreie Datei (1); PDF als Volltext kostenfreie Datei (2) Link als defekt meldenVerfügbarkeit
Reihe	Discussion paper series / Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit. 7025
Sprache	englisch
Dokumenttyp	online; Monographie; Graue Literatur
Schlagwörter	Bildungsertrag; Lohn; Unterbeschäftigung; Arbeitspapier; Theorie
Abstract	The paper provides a theoretical foundation for the empirical regularities observed in estimations of wage consequences of overeducation and undereducation. Workers with more education than required for their jobs are observed to suffer wage penalties relative to workers with the same education in jobs that only require their educational level. Similarly, workers with less education than required for their jobs earn wage rewards. These departures from the Mincer human capital earnings function can be explained by Nash bargaining between workers and employers. Under fairly mild assumptions, Nash bargaining predicts a wage penalty for overeducation and a wage reward for undereducation, and further predicts that the wage penalty will exceed the wage reward. This paper reviews the established empirical regularities and then provides Nash bargaining results that explain these regularities.
Erfasst von	ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Kiel
Update	2013/2