Literaturnachweis - Detailanzeige
Autor/inn/en | Carrillo-Tudela, Carlos; Kaas, Leo |
---|---|
Institution | Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit |
Titel | Wage dispersion and labor turnover with adverse selection. |
Quelle | Bonn (2011), 41 S.
PDF als Volltext |
Reihe | IZA discussion paper. 5935 |
Sprache | englisch |
Dokumenttyp | online; Monographie |
Schlagwörter | Lohnstruktur; Produktivität; Unternehmen; Arbeitsmarkt; Arbeitsmarktforschung; Arbeitsplatzwechsel; Arbeitsuche; Berufsanforderung; Niedrig Qualifizierter; Qualifikation; Arbeitsvertrag; Unbefristeter Arbeitsvertrag; Fluktuation; Arbeitnehmer; Hoch Qualifizierter |
Abstract | "We consider a model of on-the-job search where firms offer long-term wage contracts to workers of different ability. Firms do not observe worker ability upon hiring but learn it gradually over time. With sufficiently strong information frictions, low-wage firms offer separating contracts and hire all types of workers in equilibrium, whereas high-wage firms offer pooling contracts designed to retain high-ability workers only. Low-ability workers have higher turnover rates, they are more often employed in low-wage firms and face an earnings distribution with a higher frictional component. Furthermore, positive sorting obtains in equilibrium." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku). Forschungsmethode: Theoriebildung; Grundlagenforschung. |
Erfasst von | Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung, Nürnberg |
Update | 2012/1 |