Is training more frequent when the wage premium is smaller? Evidence from the European Community household panel.

Autor/inn/en	Bassanini, Andrea; Brunello, Giorgio
Institution	OECD
Titel	Is training more frequent when the wage premium is smaller? Evidence from the European Community household panel. Gefälligkeitsübersetzung: Kommt Weiterbildung bei geringeren Lohnzulagen häufiger vor? Erkenntnisse aus dem Europäischen Haushaltspanel.
Quelle	Paris (2006), 41 S.; 492 KB PDF als Volltext kostenfreie Datei Link als defekt meldenVerfügbarkeit
Reihe	OECD social, employment and migration working papers. 41
Sprache	englisch
Dokumenttyp	online; Monographie; Graue Literatur
Schlagwörter	Bildung; Allgemeinbildung; Allgemeinbildung; Arbeitsproduktivität; Betrieb; Bildung; Investition; Lohn; Lohnstruktur; Humankapital; Lohntheorie; Verbesserung; Bildungsertrag; Bildungsertrag; Europäische Union; Humankapital; Investition; Lohn; Lohnstruktur; Lohntheorie; Produktivitätseffekt; Arbeitsproduktivität; Betriebliche Weiterbildung; Arbeitspapier; Verbesserung; Betrieb; Europäische Union
Abstract	"According to Becker Ä1964Ü, when labour markets are perfectly competitive, general training is paid by the worker, who reaps all the benefits from the investment. Therefore, ceteris paribus, the greater the training wage premium, the greater the investment in general training. Using data from the European Community Household Panel, we compute a proxy of the training wage premium in clusters of homogeneous workers and find that smaller premia induce greater incidence of off-site training, which is likely to impart general skills. Our findings suggest that the Becker model provides insufficient guidance to understand empirical training patterns. Conversely, they are not inconsistent with theories of training in imperfectly competitive labour markets, in which firms may be willing to finance general training if the wage structure is compressed, that is, if the increase in productivity after training is greater than the increase in pay.2. The discussion shows that it is very difficult to design pension systems around these actuarial concepts alone. Most retirement income systems have several components; some of these may be actuarially fair or actuarially neutral but others, notably safety-nets to protect retirees from poverty, will by definition not fulfil the conditions of actuarial fairness or neutrality. Finally, both concepts are defined across the population, regardless of the systematic differences in life-expectancy between women and men or between low-income groups and richer workers. People who expect to live longer will get a better deal out of the pension system than those who are expected to die earlier." Die Untersuchung enthält quantitative Daten. Forschungsmethode: empirisch-quantitativ; empirisch; Querschnitt. Die Untersuchung bezieht sich auf den Zeitraum 1996 bis 1996. (author's abstract, IAB-Doku).
Erfasst von	Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung, Nürnberg
Update	2007/3