Aiding applicants: Leveling the playing field within the immediate acceptance mechanism.

Autor/inn/en	Basteck, Christian; Mantovani, Marco
Institution	Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung
Titel	Aiding applicants: Leveling the playing field within the immediate acceptance mechanism.
Quelle	Berlin (2021), 35 S. PDF als Volltext kostenfreie Datei Link als defekt meldenVerfügbarkeit
Reihe	Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Markt und Entscheidung, Abteilung Verhalten auf Märkten. SP II 2021-203
Sprache	englisch
Dokumenttyp	online; Monographie
Schlagwörter	Kognitive Kompetenz; Schulwahl; Experiment; Segregation; Benachteiligung
Abstract	In school choice problems, the widely used manipulable Immediate Acceptance mechanism (IA) disadvantages unsophisticated applicants, but may ex-ante Pareto dominate any strategy-proof alternative. In these cases, it may be preferable to aid applicants within IA, rather than to abandon it. In a laboratory experiment, we first document a substantial gap in strategy choices and outcomes between subjects of higher and lower cognitive ability under IA. We then test whether disclosing information on past applications levels the playing field. The treatment is effective in partially reducing the gap between applicants of above- and below-median cognitive ability and in curbing ability segregation across schools, but may leave the least able applicants further behind.
Erfasst von	GESIS - Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften, Mannheim
Update	2022/3