Literaturnachweis - Detailanzeige
Autor/inn/en | Rees-Jones, Alex; Shorrer, Ran; Tergiman, Chloe J. |
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Institution | National Bureau of Economic Research |
Titel | Correlation Neglect in Student-to-School Matching. NBER Working Paper No. 26734 |
Quelle | (2020)
PDF als Volltext |
Sprache | englisch |
Dokumenttyp | gedruckt; online; Monographie |
Schlagwörter | Correlation; School Choice; Admission (School); Students; Student Placement |
Abstract | A growing body of evidence suggests that decision-makers fail to account for correlation in signals that they receive. We study the relevance of this mistake in students' interactions with school-choice matching mechanisms. In a lab experiment presenting simple and incentivized school-choice scenarios, we find that subjects tend to follow optimal application strategies when schools' admissions decisions are determined independently. However, when schools rely on a common priority--inducing correlation in admissions--decision making suffers: application strategies become substantially more aggressive and fail to include attractive "safety" options. We document that this pattern holds even within-subject, with significant fractions of participants applying to different programs when correlation is varied but all payoff-relevant elements are held constant. We provide a battery of tests suggesting that this phenomenon is at least partially driven by correlation neglect, and we discuss implications that arise for the design and deployment of student-to-school matching mechanisms. [Ran Shorrer was supported by a grant from the United States--Israel Binational Science Foundation (BSF grant 2016015).] (As Provided). |
Anmerkungen | National Bureau of Economic Research. 1050 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge, MA 02138-5398. Tel: 617-588-0343; Web site: http://www.nber.org |
Erfasst von | ERIC (Education Resources Information Center), Washington, DC |
Update | 2024/1/01 |