Literaturnachweis - Detailanzeige
| Autor/inn/en | Glazerman, Steve; Dotter, Dallas |
|---|---|
| Institution | Mathematica Policy Research, Inc. |
| Titel | Market Signals: Evidence on the Determinants and Consequences of School Choice from a Citywide Lottery. Working Paper 45 |
| Quelle | (2016), (68 Seiten)
PDF als Volltext kostenfreie Datei |
| Sprache | englisch |
| Dokumenttyp | gedruckt; online; Monographie |
| Schlagwörter | Charter Schools; School Choice; Simulation; Selective Admission; Competitive Selection; Admission (School); Preferences; Public Schools; Parent Attitudes; Decision Making; Student Records; Enrollment; Institutional Characteristics; Census Figures; Elementary Secondary Education; Student Characteristics; Computation; Statistical Significance; Statistical Analysis; District of Columbia |
| Abstract | We estimate school-choice preferences revealed by the rank-ordered lists submitted by more than 22,000 applicants to a citywide lottery for more than 200 traditional and charter public schools in Washington, DC. The results confirm previously reported findings that commuting distance, school demographics, and academic indicators play important roles in school choice, and that there is considerable heterogeneity of preferences. Simulations suggest segregation by race and income would be reduced and enrollment in high-performing schools increased if policymakers were to expand school choice by relaxing school capacity constraints in individual campuses. The simulations also suggest that closing the lowest-performing schools could further reduce segregation and increase enrollment in high-performing schools. The following are appended: (1) Findings on Neighborhood and Other Non-Academic Characteristics; (2) Detailed Analysis of Endogeneity and Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives; and (3) Supplemental Tables and Figures. [For "Market Signals: How Do DC Parents Rank Schools, and What Does It Mean for Policy? Policy Brief," see ED568708.] (As Provided). |
| Anmerkungen | Mathematica Policy Research, Inc. P.O. Box 2393, Princeton, NJ 08543-2393. Tel: 609-799-3535; Fax: 609-799-0005; e-mail: info@mathematica-mpr.com; Web site: http://www.mathematica-mpr.com |
| Erfasst von | ERIC (Education Resources Information Center), Washington, DC |
| Update | 2020/1/01 |
Literaturbeschaffung und Bestandsnachweise in Bibliotheken prüfen
Permalink als QR-Code
Inhalt auf sozialen Plattformen teilen (nur vorhanden, wenn Javascript eingeschaltet ist)
Teile diese Seite:
