Minding Rachlin's Eliminative Materialism

Autor/in	McDowell, J. J.
Titel	Minding Rachlin's Eliminative Materialism
Quelle	In: Behavior Analyst, 35 (2012) 1, S.17-27 (11 Seiten) PDF als Volltext Verfügbarkeit
Sprache	englisch
Dokumenttyp	gedruckt; online; Zeitschriftenaufsatz
ISSN	0738-6729
Schlagwörter	Stellungnahme; Organizational Communication; Phenomenology; Brain; Behaviorism; Behavior Patterns; Behavioral Science Research + Suchen Sie Ihr Suchwort? Phenomenological psychology; Phänomenologie; Psychologie; Gehirn; Behaviourism; Behaviorismus
Abstract	Rachlin's teleological behaviorism eliminates the first-person ontology of conscious experience by identifying mental states with extended patterns of behavior, and thereby maintains the materialist ontology of science. An alternate view, informed by brain-based and externalist philosophies of mind, is shown also to maintain the materialist ontology of science, but without eliminating the phenomenology of consciousness. This view implies that to be judged human, machines not only must exhibit complicated temporally structured patterns of behavior, but also must have first-person conscious experience. Although confirming machine sentience is likely to be problematic, extended contact with a machine that results in a person interacting with it as if it were conscious could reasonably lead to the conclusion that for all intents and purposes it is. (As Provided).
Anmerkungen	Association for Behavior Analysis International. 1219 South Park Street, Kalamazoo, MI 49001. Tel: 269-492-9310; Fax: 269-492-9316; e-mail: mail@abainternational.org; Web site: http://www.abainternational.org
Erfasst von	ERIC (Education Resources Information Center), Washington, DC
Update	2017/4/10