Career Incentives and "Publish or Perish" in German and U.S. Universities

Autor/inn/en	Backes-Gellner, Uschi; Schlinghoff, Axel
Titel	Career Incentives and "Publish or Perish" in German and U.S. Universities
Quelle	In: European Education, 42 (2010) 3, S.26-52 (27 Seiten)Infoseite zur Zeitschrift PDF als Volltext Verfügbarkeit
Sprache	englisch
Dokumenttyp	gedruckt; online; Zeitschriftenaufsatz
ISSN	1056-4934
DOI	10.2753/EUE1056-4934420302
Schlagwörter	Incentives; Rewards; Public Service; Faculty Promotion; Foreign Countries; College Faculty; Faculty Publishing; Reputation; Productivity; Comparative Analysis; Business Administration Education; Economics; Regression (Statistics); Germany; United States + Suchen Sie Ihr Suchwort? Anreiz; Reward; Belohnung; Public services; Öffentlicher Sozialdienst; Ausland; Fakultät; Produktivität; Volkswirtschaftslehre; Regression; Regressionsanalyse; Deutschland; USA
Abstract	Increasingly, faculty members are rewarded financially for prestige-maximizing publications. As a result, the balance between publishing and other activities such as teaching or public service may collapse, as argued by Leisyte, Enders, and de Boer (2009). In our paper, we focus on career-related rewards and study their impact on publication productivity to see whether economic incentives do indeed affect faculty behavior, as measured empirically. We compare economic incentives resulting from two different career systems, namely those within the German and the U.S. university systems. We derive three hypotheses regarding expected publication patterns and test them by comparing the lifetime publication patterns of German and U.S. business and economics faculty members. (Contains 5 tables, 1 figure and 28 notes.) (As Provided).
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Erfasst von	ERIC (Education Resources Information Center), Washington, DC
Update	2017/4/10