Does Three Strikes Deter?: A Nonparametric Estimation

Autor/inn/en	Helland, Eric; Tabarrok, Alexander
Titel	Does Three Strikes Deter?: A Nonparametric Estimation
Quelle	In: Journal of Human Resources, 42 (2007) 2, S.309-330 (22 Seiten) PDF als Volltext Verfügbarkeit
Sprache	englisch
Dokumenttyp	gedruckt; online; Zeitschriftenaufsatz
ISSN	0022-166X
Schlagwörter	Criminals; Delinquency; Comparative Analysis; Court Litigation; State Legislation; Crime; California + Suchen Sie Ihr Suchwort? Straftäter; Kriminalität; Rechtsstreit; Landesrecht; Crimes; Delict; Delicts; Delikt; Kalifornien
Abstract	We take advantage of the fortuitous randomization of trial outcome to provide a novel strategy to identify the deterrent effect exclusive of incapacitation. We compare the post-sentencing criminal activity of criminals who were convicted of a strikeable offense with those who were tried for a strikeable offense but convicted of a nonstrikeable offense. As a robustness check, we also make this comparison in states without three-strikes laws. The identification strategy lets us estimate the deterrent effect nonparametrically using data solely from the three-strikes era. We find that California's three-strike legislation significantly reduces felony arrest rates among the class of criminals with two strikes by 17-20 percent. (Contains 3 tables, 8 figures, and 26 footnotes.) (Author).
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Erfasst von	ERIC (Education Resources Information Center), Washington, DC
Update	2017/4/10