School Assignment by Match Quality. Working Paper 28512

Autor/inn/en	Abdulkadiroglu, Atila; Dur, Umut M.; Grigoryan, Aram
Institution	National Bureau of Economic Research
Titel	School Assignment by Match Quality. Working Paper 28512
Quelle	(2021) PDF als Volltext Verfügbarkeit
Sprache	englisch
Dokumenttyp	gedruckt; online; Monographie
Schlagwörter	School Choice; School Effectiveness; Educational Quality; Computation; Simulation; Mathematics + Suchen Sie Ihr Suchwort? Choice of school; Schulwahl; Schuleffizienz; Quality of education; Bildungsqualität; Simulation program; Simulationsprogramm; Mathematik
Abstract	Proponents of school choice argue that it improves educational outcomes by allowing parents to self-select into schools that are most effective for their children. Contrary to these arguments, empirical evidence suggests that parents may not incorporate school effectiveness or match quality when choosing schools. The findings potentially impugn proponents' effectiveness arguments of choice-based assignment. We develop novel solutions that restore effectiveness by maximizing match quality subject to stability constraints. Maximization algorithms are provided for both small and large school districts. Simulations reveal substantial match quality gains from our solutions compared to the celebrated Deferred Acceptance mechanism with a random tie-breaker. Our methodology can be used to optimize for other policy objectives in school choice or other priority-based matching problems. (As Provided).
Anmerkungen	National Bureau of Economic Research. 1050 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge, MA 02138-5398. Tel: 617-588-0343; Web site: http://www.nber.org
Erfasst von	ERIC (Education Resources Information Center), Washington, DC
Update	2024/1/01