The Effects of Accountability Incentives in Early Childhood Education. CEPA Working Paper No. 17-10

Autor/inn/en	Bassok, Daphna; Dee, Thomas S.; Latham, Scott
Institution	Center for Education Policy Analysis (CEPA) at Stanford University
Titel	The Effects of Accountability Incentives in Early Childhood Education. CEPA Working Paper No. 17-10
Quelle	(2017), (53 Seiten) PDF als Volltext kostenfreie Datei Verfügbarkeit
Zusatzinformation	Weitere Informationen
Sprache	englisch
Dokumenttyp	gedruckt; online; Monographie
Schlagwörter	Accountability; Early Childhood Education; Quality Control; Program Effectiveness; Rating Scales; Enrollment; Hypothesis Testing; Parent Attitudes; School Choice; Influences; Competition; State Standards; Institutional Evaluation; Regression (Statistics); Correlation; North Carolina + Suchen Sie Ihr Suchwort? Verantwortung; Early childhood; Education; Frühkindliche Bildung; Frühpädagogik; Qualitätskontrolle; Rating-Skala; Einschulung; Hypothesenprüfung; Hypothesentest; Elternverhalten; Choice of school; Schulwahl; Influence; Einfluss; Einflussfaktor; Wettkampf; Regression; Regressionsanalyse; Korrelation
Abstract	In an effort to enhance the quality of early childhood education (ECE) at scale, nearly all U.S. states have recently adopted Quality Rating and Improvement Systems (QRIS). These accountability systems give providers and parents information on program quality and create both reputational and financial incentives for program improvement. However, we know little about whether these accountability reforms operate as theorized. This study provides the first empirical evidence on this question using data from North Carolina, a state with a mature QRIS. Using a regression discontinuity design, we examine how quasi-random assignment to a lower quality rating influenced subsequent outcomes of ECE programs. We find that programs responded to a lower quality rating with comparative performance gains, including improvement on a multi-faceted measure of classroom quality. Programs quasi-randomly assigned to a lower star rating also experienced enrollment declines, which is consistent with the hypothesis that parents responded to information about program quality by selectively enrolling away from programs with lower ratings. These effects were concentrated among programs that faced higher levels of competition from nearby providers. (As Provided).
Anmerkungen	Stanford Center for Education Policy Analysis. 520 Galvez Mall, CERAS Building, 5th Floor, Stanford, CA 94305. Tel: 650-736-1258; Fax: 650-723-9931; e-mail: contactcepa@stanford.edu; Web site: http://cepa.stanford.edu
Erfasst von	ERIC (Education Resources Information Center), Washington, DC
Update	2020/1/01