Intergovernmental (Dis)incentives, Free-Riding, Teacher Salaries and Teacher Pensions. Upjohn Institute Working Paper No. 15-220

Autor/in	Fitzpatrick, Maria D.
Institution	W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
Titel	Intergovernmental (Dis)incentives, Free-Riding, Teacher Salaries and Teacher Pensions. Upjohn Institute Working Paper No. 15-220
Quelle	(2015), (57 Seiten) PDF als Volltext Verfügbarkeit
Sprache	englisch
Dokumenttyp	gedruckt; online; Monographie
DOI	10.17848/wp15-220
Schlagwörter	Teacher Salaries; Retirement Benefits; Incentives; Public Schools; Employees; Compensation (Remuneration); Individual Characteristics; Teacher Retirement; State Legislation; Government Role; Local Government; State Boards of Education; Age Differences; School Personnel; State Policy; Labor Turnover; Statistical Analysis; Illinois + Suchen Sie Ihr Suchwort? Lehrerbesoldung; Lehrervergütung; Retirement pay; Ruhegehalt; Anreiz; Public school; Öffentliche Schule; Employee; Arbeitnehmer; Beschäftigter; Abfindung; Kompensation; Lohnausgleich; Personality characteristic; Personality traits; Persönlichkeitsmerkmal; Landesrecht; Gemeindeverwaltung; Age; Difference; Age difference; Altersunterschied; Schulpersonal; Statistische Analyse
Abstract	In this paper, I document evidence that intergovernmental incentives inherent in public sector defined benefit pension systems distort the amount and timing of income for public school teachers. This intergovernmental incentive stems from the fact that, in many states, local school districts are responsible for setting the compensation that determines the size of pensions, but are not required to make contributions to cover the resulting pension fund liabilities. I use the introduction of a policy that required experience-rating on compensation increases above a certain limit in a differences-in-differences framework to identify whether districts are willing to pay the full costs of their compensation promises. In response to the policy, the size and distribution of compensation changed significantly. On average, public school employees received lower wages largely through the removal of retirement bonuses. However, the design of the policy led some districts to increase compensation, rendering the policy less effective than it might have otherwise been. The following tables are appended: (1) Characteristics of Employees of Illinois Public Schools in the Analysis Sample, 2003-2011; and (2) District Characteristics in 2005, by Survey Response. (As Provided).
Anmerkungen	W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research. 300 South Westnedge Avenue, Kalamazoo, MI 49007-4686. Tel: 888-227-8569; Tel: 269-343-4330; Fax: 269-343-7310; Web site: http://www.upjohninstitute.org
Erfasst von	ERIC (Education Resources Information Center), Washington, DC
Update	2020/1/01