Army Training. Expenditures for Troop Schools Have Not Been Justified. Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Readiness, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives.

Institution	General Accounting Office, Washington, DC. National Security and International Affairs Div.
Titel	Army Training. Expenditures for Troop Schools Have Not Been Justified. Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Readiness, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives.
Quelle	(1993), (28 Seiten) PDF als Volltext kostenfreie Datei Verfügbarkeit
Sprache	englisch
Dokumenttyp	gedruckt; online; Monographie
Schlagwörter	Adult Education; Armed Forces; Cost Effectiveness; Costs; Enlisted Personnel; Job Training; Military Service; Military Training; Needs Assessment; Postsecondary Education; Program Administration; Program Effectiveness; Program Evaluation; Vocational Education + Suchen Sie Ihr Suchwort? Adult; Adults; Education; Adult basic education; Adult training; Erwachsenenbildung; Military; Militär; Kosten-Nutzen-Analyse; Kosten-Nutzen-Denken; Cost; Kosten; Berufsqualifizierender Bildungsgang; Militärdienst; Militärausbildung; Bedarfsermittlung; Post-secondary education; Tertiäre Bildung; Programme evaluation; Programmevaluation; Ausbildung; Berufsbildung
Abstract	A review of the Army's troop schools found that the internal control weaknesses in the program first reported over 10 years ago still existed. Expenditures were not justified. Most justifications reviewed were not based on assessed performance deficiencies of individual soldiers, as required, and none documented that troop schools were the most cost-effective alternative. The Army was not exercising adequate control over troop school operations. For example, the Army had continued to offer many courses without proper authorization, wasted money by paying for unneeded course offerings, and allowed contractors to administer tests to determine whether soldiers need training, despite the potential for creating false demand. The persistent nature of troop school management problems clearly indicated that the Army had not followed up on the corrective actions it initiated in response to findings and recommendations of the earlier study. Actions taken by the Army in 1990 to assign program monitoring responsibilities and to call top management's attention to material control weaknesses through the Secretary of the Army's Annual Statement on Internal Control were significant steps in the right direction. However, the Army did not follow through on these initial steps. Monitoring and follow-up were needed to ensure that corrective actions were properly implemented and that problems were resolved. (Appendixes include comments from the Department of Defense.) (YLB)
Anmerkungen	U.S. General Accounting Office, P.O. Box 6015, Gaithersburg, MD 20884-6015 (first copy free; additional copies, $2 each; 100 or more, 25% discount).
Erfasst von	ERIC (Education Resources Information Center), Washington, DC