The Political Economy of "Excessive" Regulation: The Case of Educational Opportunity.

Autor/in	Chubb, John E.
Institution	Stanford Univ., CA. Inst. for Research on Educational Finance and Governance.
Titel	The Political Economy of "Excessive" Regulation: The Case of Educational Opportunity.
Quelle	(1981), (52 Seiten)Verfügbarkeit
Sprache	englisch
Dokumenttyp	gedruckt; Monographie
Schlagwörter	Stellungnahme; Administrators; Bureaucracy; Elementary Secondary Education; Equal Education; Federal Aid; Federal Regulation; Government School Relationship; Models; Program Implementation; Teachers + Suchen Sie Ihr Suchwort? Bürokratie; Bundeskompetenz; Analogiemodell; Lehrer; Lehrerin; Lehrende
Abstract	Evaluating the charge that federal regulation of education is "excessive" entails a political analysis of regulatory problems and of the relative cost efficiencies of providing equal educational opportunity, the goal of much federal regulation. The theoretical framework for this political explanation emphasizes the "implementation relationships" that develop between the regulatory bureaucracy and the constituencies affected by equal opportunity laws (for instance, poor children, schools, or teachers). Implementation relationships can be "corporatists," in which the bureaucracy cooperates with a constituency represented by one or two major beneficiary organizations; "pluralist," where the bureaucracy has many relationships with both beneficiary and cost-bearing constituencies; or one of "capture," in which the bureaucracy collaborates with one or two major cost-bearing constituencies. The 15-year implementation history of Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) indicates that educational professionals in local education agencies have established a "capture" relationship with the federal bureaucracy. Further political analysis locates the reasons for this capture in ESEA Title I's mix of allocation and regulation policies and in the congressional, presidential, and judicial constraints on the bureaucracy. The capture relationship has meant relatively lax but more cost-efficient regulation. (Author/RW)
Anmerkungen	Institute for Research on Educational Finance and Governance, CERAS Bldg., Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305 ($1.00).
Erfasst von	ERIC (Education Resources Information Center), Washington, DC