Barrier to Entry or Signal of Quality? The Effects of Occupational Licensing on Minority Dental Assistants.

Autor/in	Xia, Xing
Titel	Barrier to Entry or Signal of Quality? The Effects of Occupational Licensing on Minority Dental Assistants. Gefälligkeitsübersetzung: Zugangsbarriere oder Gütesiegel? Die Auswirkungen beruflicher Lizenzierung auf Zahnarzthelfer, die Minderheiten angehören.
Quelle	In: Labour economics, (2021) 71 PDF als Volltext Link als defekt meldenVerfügbarkeit
Sprache	englisch
Dokumenttyp	online; Zeitschriftenaufsatz
ISSN	0927-5371
DOI	10.1016/j.labeco.2021.102027
Schlagwörter	Kompetenz; Regulation; USA; Auswirkung; Lizenz; Kompetenz; Einkommensunterschied; Ethnische Gruppe; Zusatzqualifikation; Zahnarzthelfer; Berufsrecht; Assistent; Minderheit; Einkommensunterschied; Beschäftigungseffekt; Einkommenseffekt; Zusatzqualifikation; Berufsrecht; Zahnarzthelfer; Zahnmedizinischer Fachhelfer; Auswirkung; Lizenz; Regulation; Zugangsvoraussetzung; Ethnische Gruppe; Minderheit; Assistent; Hispanoamerikaner; Weißer; USA
Abstract	"Economic theory suggests that occupational licensing can be a barrier to entry that restricts labor supply (Friedman, 1962; Stigler, 1971) or a signal of quality that enhances the labor market (Leland, 1979). This paper studies two types of licenses for dental assistants (DAs) in the U.S. to illustrate the competing supply-restricting and quality-signaling effects of licensing on minority workers. Specifically, I study the effects of introducing the X-ray permit, a state-issued license to perform X-ray procedures that also carries information about a DA' s competence, against that of the entry-level license, which provides little information about a DA' s competence. I find that the X-ray permit requirement reduces the wage gap between non-Hispanic white and minority DAs by 8 percent, presumably because it helps minority DAs secure jobs that entail X-ray procedures. In contrast, entry-level licensing does not reduce the racial wage gap. These findings suggest that licensing alleviates statistical discrimination if it reveals information about the holder' s productivity." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku, © 2021 Elsevier).
Erfasst von	Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung, Nürnberg
Update	2022/2