College admissions with entrance exams: centralized versus decentralized.

Autor/inn/en	Hafalir, Isa E.; Hakimov, Rustamdjan; Kübler, Dorothea; Kurino, Morimitsu
Institution	Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung
Titel	College admissions with entrance exams: centralized versus decentralized.
Quelle	Berlin (2014), 48 S. PDF als Volltext kostenfreie Datei Link als defekt meldenVerfügbarkeit
Reihe	Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Markt und Entscheidung, Abteilung Verhalten auf Märkten. SP II 2014-208
Sprache	englisch
Dokumenttyp	online; Monographie
Schlagwörter	Bildungsniveau; Leistungsfähigkeit; Verhalten; College; Aufnahmeprüfung; Experiment; Ranking; Kosten; Wettbewerb; Studentenwerk; Hochschule; Dezentralisierung; Zentralisierung; Student
Abstract	We theoretically and experimentally study a college admissions problem in which colleges accept students by ranking students' efforts in entrance exams. Students hold private information regarding their ability level that affects the cost of their efforts. We assume that student preferences are homogeneous over colleges. By modeling college admissions as contests, we solve and compare the equilibria of "centralized college admissions" (CCA) in which students apply to all colleges, and "decentralized college admissions" (DCA) in which students can only apply to one college. We show that lower ability students prefer DCA whereas higher ability students prefer CCA. The main qualitative predictions of the theory are supported by the experimental data, yet we find a number of behavioral differences between the mechanisms that render DCA less attractive than CCA compared to the equilibrium benchmark. (author's abstract).
Erfasst von	GESIS - Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften, Mannheim
Update	2020/3