Models and cognition. Prediction and explanation in everyday life and in science.

Autor/in	Waskan, Jonathan A.
Titel	Models and cognition. Prediction and explanation in everyday life and in science.
Quelle	Cambridge, Mass. u.a.: MIT Press (2006), XIV, 323 S.Verfügbarkeit
Beigaben	Illustrationen; Literatur- und URL-Angaben S. [303]-317
Sprache	deutsch
Dokumenttyp	gedruckt; Monographie
ISBN	0-262-51754-X; 978-0-262-51754-6
Schlagwörter	Psychologische Forschung; Erkennen; Kognition; Kognitionspsychologie; Kognitionswissenschaft; Wahrnehmung; Erklärung; Kognition; Logik; Modell; Neurobiologie; Neurophysiologie; Wahrnehmung; Hirnforschung; Lehrbuch; Erkennen; Neuropsychologie; Verstand; Kognitionswissenschaft; Virtuelle Realität; Erklärung; Lehrbuch; Hirnforschung; Neurobiologie; Neurowissenschaften; Virtuelle Realität; Logik; Verstand; Neurowissenschaften; Neurophysiologie; Neuropsychologie; Modell
Abstract	The author challenges cognitive science's dominant model of mental representation and proposes a novel, well-devised alternative. The traditional view in the cognitive sciences uses a linguistic (propositional) model of mental representation. That logic-based model of cognition informs and constrains both the classical tradition of artificial intelligence and modeling in the connectionist tradition. It falls short, however, when confronted by the frame problem-the lack of a principled way to determine which features of a representation must be updated when new information becomes available. So far, proposed alternatives, including the imagistic model, have not resolved the problem. The author proposes the Intrinsic Cognitive Models (ICM) hypothesis, according to which representation states can be conceptualized as the cognitive equivalent of scale models. The author argues further that the proposal that humans harbor and manipulate cognitive counterparts to scale models offers the only viable explanation for what most clearly differentiates humans from other creatures: the capacity to engage in truth-preserving manipulation of representations. The ICM hypothesis, he claims, can be distinguished from sentence-based accounts of truth preservation in a way that is fully compatible with what is known about the brain. (Orig.).
Erfasst von	DIPF \| Leibniz-Institut für Bildungsforschung und Bildungsinformation, Frankfurt am Main
Update	2013/4