"If" and "Or": Real and Counterfactual Possibilities in Their Truth and Probability

Autor/inn/en	Byrne, Ruth M. J.; Johnson-Laird, P. N.
Titel	"If" and "Or": Real and Counterfactual Possibilities in Their Truth and Probability
Quelle	In: Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 46 (2020) 4, S.760-780 (21 Seiten) PDF als Volltext Verfügbarkeit
Zusatzinformation	ORCID (Byrne, Ruth M. J.)
Sprache	englisch
Dokumenttyp	gedruckt; online; Zeitschriftenaufsatz
ISSN	0278-7393
DOI	10.1037/xlm0000756
Schlagwörter	Ethics; Probability; Schemata (Cognition); Logical Thinking; Inferences; Evaluative Thinking; Syntax + Suchen Sie Ihr Suchwort? Ethik; Wahrscheinlichkeitsrechnung; Wahrscheinlichkeitstheorie; Cognition; Schema; Kognition; Inference; Inferenz
Abstract	The theory of mental models postulates that conditionals and disjunctions refer to possibilities, real or counterfactual. Factual conditionals, for example, "If there's an apple, there's a pear," parallel counterfactual ones, for example, "If there had been an apple, there would have been a pear." A similar parallel underlies disjunctions. Individuals estimate the probabilities of conditionals by adjusting the probability of their "then"-clauses according to the effects of their if-clauses, and the probabilities of disjunctions by a rough average of the probabilities of their disjuncts. Hence, the theory predicts that estimates of the joint probabilities of these assertions with each of the four cases in their partitions will be grossly subadditive, summing to over 100%. Five experiments corroborated these predictions. Factual conditionals and disjunctions were judged true in the same cases as their counterfactual equivalents, and the sum of their joint probabilities with cases in the partition ranged from 240% to 270% (Experiments 1a, 1b). When participants were told these probabilities should not sum to more than 100%, estimates of the probability of "A and C," as the model theory predicts, were higher for factual than counterfactual conditionals, whereas estimates of the probability of "not-A and not-C" had the opposite difference (Experiment 1c). Judgments of truth or falsity distinguished between conditionals that were certain and those that might have counterexamples (Experiment 2a), whereas judgments of the likelihood of truth reflected the probabilities of counterexamples (Experiment 2b). We discuss implications for alternative theories based on standard logic, suppositions, probabilistic logic, and causal Bayes networks. (As Provided).
Anmerkungen	American Psychological Association. Journals Department, 750 First Street NE, Washington, DC 20002. Tel: 800-374-2721; Tel: 202-336-5510; Fax: 202-336-5502; e-mail: order@apa.org; Web site: http://www.apa.org
Erfasst von	ERIC (Education Resources Information Center), Washington, DC
Update	2024/1/01