An Evolutionary Game Model of Collaborative Innovation between Enterprises and Colleges under Government Participation of China

Autor/inn/en	Su, Nina; Shi, Zhuqin; Zhu, Xianqi; Xin, Yunsheng
Titel	An Evolutionary Game Model of Collaborative Innovation between Enterprises and Colleges under Government Participation of China
Quelle	In: SAGE Open, 11 (2021) 1, (16 Seiten)Infoseite zur Zeitschrift PDF als Volltext Verfügbarkeit
Zusatzinformation	ORCID (Su, Nina)
Sprache	englisch
Dokumenttyp	gedruckt; online; Zeitschriftenaufsatz
ISSN	2158-2440
DOI	10.1177/2158244021994854
Schlagwörter	Foreign Countries; School Business Relationship; Government School Relationship; Higher Education; Innovation; Incentives; Small Businesses; Cooperation; Research and Development; Game Theory; China + Suchen Sie Ihr Suchwort? Ausland; Hochschulbildung; Hochschulsystem; Hochschulwesen; Anreiz; Kleingewerbe; Co-operation; Kooperation; Forschung und Entwicklung; Spieltheorie
Abstract	The three-party evolutionary game model of government, enterprises, and institutions of higher learning is established, and the dynamic evolution process of collaborative innovation behavior is discussed under the two strategies of "incentive" and "non-incentive" chosen by the government. The results show that under the premise of stronger innovation consciousness of the government and institutions and smaller the innovation cost of enterprises, the system is easier to reach the ideal state. The incentive degree of government should be controlled within a reasonable range to prevent enterprises from falling into a bad state because of the temptation of economic interests. (As Provided).
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Erfasst von	ERIC (Education Resources Information Center), Washington, DC
Update	2024/1/01