How to Infer Possibilities: A Reply to Oaksford et al. (2018)

Autor/inn/en	Hinterecker, Thomas; Knauff, Markus; Johnson-Laird, P. N.
Titel	How to Infer Possibilities: A Reply to Oaksford et al. (2018)
Quelle	In: Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 45 (2019) 2, S.298-301 (4 Seiten) PDF als Volltext Verfügbarkeit
Sprache	englisch
Dokumenttyp	gedruckt; online; Zeitschriftenaufsatz
ISSN	0278-7393
DOI	10.1037/xlm0000627
Schlagwörter	Stellungnahme; Logical Thinking; Abstract Reasoning; Inferences; Probability; Models; Theories; Criticism; Prediction; Bayesian Statistics + Suchen Sie Ihr Suchwort? Abstraktes Denken; Denken; Inference; Inferenz; Wahrscheinlichkeitsrechnung; Wahrscheinlichkeitstheorie; Analogiemodell; Theory; Theorie; Kritik; Vorhersage
Abstract	Individuals draw conclusions about possibilities from assertions that make no explicit reference to them. The model theory postulates that assertions such as disjunctions refer to possibilities. Hence, a disjunction of the sort, "A or B or both," where "A" and "B" are sensible clauses, yields mental models of an exhaustive conjunction of "possibly A," "possibly B," and "possibly both A and B," which each hold in default of information to the contrary. Oaksford, Over, and Cruz (this issue) are critical of the model theory and defend a probabilistic approach to reasoning. In this reply, we deal with their three main claims: (a) "Our results concern only the periphery of their probabilistic theory." We show that they refute their theory insofar as it applies to possibilities. (b) "The model theory leads to logical absurdities." We rebut this criticism as it applies to the model theory in Hinterecker, Knauff, and Johnson-Laird (2016), and explain why standard modal logics, which concern possibilities, do not set appropriate norms for inferences about them. (c) "The algorithm for reasoning based on models needs a normative theory." In fact, it has such a theory, but the demand for "a specification of a sound, complete, and decidable normative system" is chimerical for everyday reasoning. [For the article by Oaksford et al., "Paradigms, Possibilities, and Probabilities: Comment on Hinterecker, Knauff, and Johnson-Laird (2016)," see EJ1204226.] (As Provided).
Anmerkungen	American Psychological Association. Journals Department, 750 First Street NE, Washington, DC 20002. Tel: 800-374-2721; Tel: 202-336-5510; Fax: 202-336-5502; e-mail: order@apa.org; Web site: http://www.apa.org
Erfasst von	ERIC (Education Resources Information Center), Washington, DC
Update	2020/1/01