Optimal Incentives for Public Sector Workers: The Case of Teacher-Designed Incentive Pay in Texas. Working Paper 2009-05

Autor/inn/en	Taylor, Lori L.; Springer, Matthew G.
Institution	Vanderbilt University, National Center on Performance Incentives
Titel	Optimal Incentives for Public Sector Workers: The Case of Teacher-Designed Incentive Pay in Texas. Working Paper 2009-05
Quelle	(2009), (53 Seiten) PDF als Volltext Verfügbarkeit
Sprache	englisch
Dokumenttyp	gedruckt; online; Monographie
Schlagwörter	Teacher Effectiveness; Teacher Persistence; Teacher Motivation; Program Effectiveness; Public Sector; Faculty Mobility; Public Education; Unions; Productivity; Teacher Attitudes; Awards; Educational Change; Policy Analysis; Grants; Program Evaluation; Incentives; Merit Pay; Program Design; Program Implementation; Institutional Characteristics; State Programs; Compensation (Remuneration); Educational Policy; Educational Finance; Public School Teachers; Teacher Evaluation; Evaluation Criteria; Salary Wage Differentials; Teacher Participation; Texas + Suchen Sie Ihr Suchwort? Effectiveness of teaching; Instructional effectiveness; Lehrerleistung; Unterrichtserfolg; Öffentlicher Sektor; Öffentliche Erziehung; Produktivität; Lehrerverhalten; Award; Auszeichnung; Bildungsreform; Politikfeldanalyse; Grant; Finanzielle Beihilfe; Programme evaluation; Programmevaluation; Anreiz; Leistungszulage; Programme design; Programmaufbau; Programmplanung; Regierungsprogramm; Abfindung; Kompensation; Lohnausgleich; Politics of education; Bildungspolitik; Bildungsfonds; Teacher appraisal; Lehrerbeurteilung
Abstract	Pay for performance is a popular public education reform, and millions of dollars are currently being targeted for pay for performance programs. These reforms are popular because economic and management theories suggest that well-designed incentive pay programs could improve teacher effectiveness. There is little evidence about the characteristics of a well-designed incentive pay plan for teachers, however. This study takes advantage of a recent natural experiment in Texas to explore the optimal design of teacher incentive plans. We find that when given the opportunity, teachers design relatively weak incentive pay plans. In turn, those relatively weak incentives do not appear to have induced any significant changes in teacher productivity, although they did have a significant impact on teacher turnover. As such, our evidence suggests that the types of incentives that appeal to teachers (and their unions) may not be optimal from the employer perspective. (Contains 7 tables, 2 figures and 20 footnotes.) (As Provided).
Anmerkungen	National Center on Performance Incentives. Peabody College of Vanderbilt University, PMB #43, 230 Appleton Place, Nashville, TN 37203. Tel: 615-322-5538; Fax: 615-322-6018; e-mail: ncpi@vanderbilt.edu; Web site: http://www.performanceincentives.org
Erfasst von	ERIC (Education Resources Information Center), Washington, DC
Update	2017/4/10